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1. SUMMARY 
This study is devoted to implement an environmental risk assessment (ERA) 
methodology for a Liquefied Natural GAS (LNG) plant located in Spain. ERA also 
includes the estimation of the Environmental Damage Index (EDI) and the calculation 
of the economical guarantee established by the Environmental Responsibility Offer 
Model (EROM). This study has been carried out according to Spain regulations, in 
particular, Royal Decree 183/2015 of environmental responsibility. 
The environmental risk assessment was performed using the Spain Natural Gas 
methodology unified with ERA procedure established by AENOR in UNE-150.008-2008 
standard. 
Applying the methodology, different hazardous agents were identified in the 
LNG plant such as diesel, THT, hydraulic oil, sodium bisulfite, natural gas and others. 
They were also considered different initiating events (including tanks failure, pipeline 
ruptures and cisterns leakage) reaching different accidental scenarios where marine 
water and seabirds were the resources affected. 
Seawater pollution with diesel was the accidental scenario selected to calculate 
the financial guarantee, because it has the highest percentage of risk. Environmental 
evaluation identified the affectation of 708 m
3 
of marine water, 4 threatened and 178 
non-threatened seabird species. The marine water affectation covers 84.91% of the 
total guarantee estimation, representing the relevant damage to the environment by 
diesel spill. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, the industrial growing in the world has increased the concern about 
the environmental impact of the human activity. Europe has been established rules for 
industrial operations and properly legislation to reduce environmental affectation in 
the continent. 
According to the Environmental Responsibility Spain Regulation, Royal Decree 
183/2015 of March 13
th
, the operator has to develop the Environmental Risk 
Assessment (ERA) and establish the economic guarantee estimation to support the 
industrial activity. This study is devoted to the implementation of ERA methodology for 
a Liquefied Natural GAS (LNG) plant, including the evaluation of the Environmental 
Damage Index (EDI) and the calculation of the economical guarantee established by 
the Environmental Responsibility Offer Model (EROM). 
The ERA preparation has been taken as a reference framework established by 
the Spanish Association for Normalization and Certification (AENOR), in the standard 
UNE 150.008-2008, and the “Methodological Guide for the Preparation of 
Environmental Risk Analysis for LNG plants” prepared by the Spanish Gas Association 
(SEDIGAS) and approved in March 2015 
2.1. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
Natural Gas is a fossil hydrocarbon formed in permeable rock of the earth´s 
court and is found in association or not with crude oil. It might occur alone in separate 
reservoirs, but more commonly it forms a gas cap entrapped between petroleum and 
an impermeable layer, covering rock layer in a petroleum reservoir. Under high 
pressure conditions, it is mixed with or dissolved in crude oil. Natural gas named dry 
has less than 0.013 dm3/m3 (0.1 gal/1000 ft3) of gasoline. Above this amount, it is 
named wet.  [1] 
Table 1 Natural Gas Typical composition [1] 
Composition, vol% 
Range 
Low High 
Methane 86.3 95.2 
Ethane 2.5 8.1 
Propane 0.6 2.8 
Butanes 0.1 0.7 
Pentanes 0.0 0.4 
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Table 1 Natural Gas Typical composition [1] 
Composition, vol% 
Range 
Low High 
Hexanes plus 0.0 0.1 
CO2 0.3 1.1 
N2 0.3 2.5 
Hexanes plus 0.0 0.1 
Heating Value MJ/m
3
 ( 
Btu/ft
3
) 
38.15 (1024) 40.2 (1093) 
Specific gravity 
Ref: Air at 288K 
0.6 0.6 
 
When the natural gas has been cooled to the condensation point, which occurs 
at -256
o
F (-161
o
C) and atmospheric pressure, we obtain the Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG).  Liquefaction reduces the volume by approximately 600 times so making it more 
economical to transport between continents in specially designed ocean vessels, 
whereas traditional pipeline transportation systems would be less economically 
attractive and could be technically or politically infeasible. Thus, LNG technology 
makes natural gas available throughout the world. [2] 
For these reasons, LNG can be an alternative, cheaper and friendlier with 
environment fuel source in the world. Many countries are involved in this change, 
installing storage and regasification plants, and being part of this emergent market.  
 
Figure 1 World LNG Growth demand [3] 
  
2.2. Liquefied Natural Gas Process
The LNG Plants main function is to receive LNG from vessels
product and distribute it to the dif
(NG) volatility, all the process occurs at cryogenic conditions to maintain the liquid 
state of LNG guaranteeing the transportation and storage of the highest possible 
amount of product. The final stag
vaporized for the final consumption.  Figure 2 shows the typical configuration of a LNG 
plant. 
• Marine Facilities: loading/unloading arm
• LNG Storage Tanks: cryogenic tanks with especial configuration. 
• Regasification system high pressure pumps
• Sea water system: it is the complement of the regasific
the sea water pumps and the water chemical treatment to avoid scale in the 
exchanger. 
• Boil-off gas compressor: to recover the technical minimum gas and reliquefy in 
the storage tanks or distribute to natural gas pipeline.
• Utilities area: nitrogen
• Natural Gas exportation: measurement Station.
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Figure 2 Typical LNG Plant configuration [4] 
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2.3. Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA)
Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is a methodology for the evaluation of 
the adverse effects that could affect en
ERA procedure is triggered prior to a significant decision affecting the environment
can be divided into three wide steps: 
• Preparation: involving collecting and examinin
information, and establishing the focus for the assessment.
• Conducting and prepare the assessment.
• Interpreting, reporting and applying results of the assessment.
ERA is a support tool for policy evaluation
management making. It is systematic and can be applied in a variety of situations
ranging from those with minimal available data and resources to those with detailed 
inventories and complex systems modeling. ERA can be used on the back of an 
envelope while preparing for a meeting or developed to provide risk information to a 
formal legislated process such as SEVESO influenced process. 
ERA provides information for making reasoned decisions by defining the range 
of risks associated with various option
Figure 3 General Framework Risk Analysis Methodology 
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2.4.  FAULT TREE METHODOLOGY 
The Fault Tree methodology constitutes a well-known and a widely used 
technique in risk assessment and reliability studies, because it provides both 
qualitative and quantitative results. This method is based on the laws of Boole’s 
algebra, and it is based on a deductive process that lets the determination of a studied 
event’s expression, depending on the basic failures of the elements that take part in it 
[6]. 
The first step must be the identification of the “not wished” or TOP event 
(accident to be avoided), which is going to be ranged on the peak upper part of the 
representative graphical structure of the tree. The TOP events can be the accidents 
previously identified by the event tree methodology, and they must be properly and 
clearly defined because the successful development of the whole tree hangs on it  
The second step is the systematic identification of all the immediate causes that 
contribute to its occurrence (conditioning factors). In this step, the so called 
intermediate events are settled down in a systematic way and can be decomposed to 
their direct causes. In the graphical representation, these are reflected inside 
rectangular boxes and the union between them is made by the use of logical gates.  
The connections between gates are made with the AND and OR signals: [6] 
• The AND gate is used to symbolize a logical “and”. In the case presented below, 
the logical exit S will happen only if both logical entrances (e1 and e2) occur at 
the same time. 
• OR is used to show a logical “or”, Its symbol is the one showed below and 
means that the logical exit S will happen as long as, at least one of both logical 
entrances (e1 or e2) occurs.  
The splitting process of the intermediate events is successively repeated until getting 
to the basic (initial) events of the tree. These elements do not require being further 
split attending to two main reasons: on the one hand, its division would not provide 
additional information, and on the other hand, their failure rate does not depend on 
any other element and can be directly found in any reliable available data bank. 
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Figure 4  AND and OR representation in a fault tree 
These basic events could either represent an equipment failure, an operational 
human error or even the occurrence of an external event (such as fire, earthquake, 
etc.). Their graphical representation in the Fault Tree figures is commonly reflected by 
circles which are normally numbered to facilitate the identification. [6] 
In this analysis, there are two well differentiated stages. The first one consists 
on the Tree elaboration, where all knowledge related to the functioning and operation 
of the facility must be integrated. 
The second stage pretends to quantify the Fault Tree. Thus, the logic of the 
Tree is therefore reduced until reach the minimal combinations of the primary events, 
whose simultaneous occurrence drives to the occurrence of the TOP element. Each of 
these combinations, also called minimal cut-sets, belong to a logical intersection of 
several basic elements. Since in a Fault Tree it is assumed that each of the basic events 
is independent (the materialization of one of the events does not have any influence in 
the occurrence of any other), the probability of a minimal cut-set is the result of each 
of the individual probabilities of the basic elements. [6] 
 
Figure 5 shows a typical fault tree development for chemical spill during a 
truck discharge. 
Logical 
entrance 1
Logical 
entrance 2
Logical 
entrance 1
Logical 
entrance 2
Logical Exit (S) Logical Exit (S)
AND
OR
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Figure 5  Chemical Spill during truck discharge, Fault tree example 
 
2.5. EVENT TREE METHODOLOGY 
The Event Tree analysis (also called Event Sequence Analysis) is an inductive 
method providing a qualitative and quantitative assessment of what occurs between 
an initiating accidental scenario and an eventual accident according to the 
characteristics of the initiator, the characteristics of the installation and the safety 
systems. [7] 
Starting with the initial fault, or initiator, and considering the conditioning 
factors involved. the tree describes the accidental sequences leading to possible 
accidents. The Event Tree construction and evaluation start with the identification of 
the factors that define the evolution of an incident from the beginning to the final 
accident. next followed by the determination of the probability of success/failure of 
each one of those factors. The graphical representation will be developed by 
positioning each of the N factors identified as headers and starting with the initiator. 
followed by systematically plotting two branches: the upper branch showing the 
AND
Chemical Spill during 
truck discharge
Occurs leakage
or
Human error Hose Failure
Instantaneus Tank 
wagon spill
Discharge Happen
1E -2 year-1 3,5E-2 year-1 1E-2 year-1
4,11E-6^*F year-1
3,6E-2 year-1
1,14E-4^*F year-1
F=Discharge times
Basic failure element Basic failure element Basic failure element
TOP Event
Conditioning eventIntermediate event
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success or occurrence of the event (with probability P) and the lower branch showing 
the failure or non-occurrence of the event (probability 1-P). [7] 
As a result of this distribution, 2N combinations or sequences are obtained. 
However, because of the dependent relationships between events, the occurrence or 
success of one may eliminate the possibility of others, consequently decreasing the 
total number of sequences. The headers are usually plotted horizontally in 
chronological order of the evolution of the accident, although this criterion is in some 
cases difficult to apply. 
The following event tree provides an example of how it is constructed and 
evaluated: 
 
Figure 6 Event tree graphical representation 
2.6.    Environmental Damage Index (EDI) 
The Environmental Damage Index (EDI) assigns an order of magnitude to the 
damage caused by each accidental scenario presented, It allows rank the importance 
of each one of the possible damages. Thus, the damage that accumulates 95% of the 
probability is selected to perform the monetization of damage. [8, 9] 
The procedure for calculating the EDI is specified in Royal Decree 183/2015, by 
amending the Regulation of partial development of the Law 26/2007 of October 23, 
Environmental Responsibility, approved by Royal Decree 2090/2008 of 22 December. 
The EDI methodology is based on an equation which includes a number of input 
parameters to obtain a Semi-quantitative estimation of the environmental damage. 
These input parameters depend on the combination of agent injurious and affected 
COD
Frequency
(years-1)
LIKELIHOOD
F*A*B
P2 B
P1 A
1-P2 (1-B) F*A*(1-B)
x.x
F
F*(1-A)
1-P1 1-A Final Accident 3
Frequency (years 
-1
)
F A B
Initiating Event Conditioning factor 1 Conditioning factor 2 Final accident
Final Accident 1
Final Accident 2Initiating Event A
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natural resource being evaluated. In particular, Royal Decree 183/2015 includes a total 
of twenty agent-resource partners groups. [8, 9]  
  ∑ 	
              
  	    1  

 
    Ec.1 
Where: 
Ecf= Fix cost estimation 
A. B. C= EDI modificators 
Ecu=Unit cost estimation 
Macc= Quantitive of resource affected.  
q. p= resource EDI modification parameter. 
Ecr=Project control and review cost. 
Ecc= Reparation consulting cost. 
β= Distant from nearest access road. 
Eca= Access to the damage area cost. 
In order to establish the parameters that affect the calculation of EDI. the 
Figure 7 shows the relation between damage source agent and the resource. 
 
Figure 7  Relative parameters and group combination Resource- Agent 
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2.7.    Environmental Responsibility Offer Model (EROM) 
The EROM methodology established the financial guarantee necessary to cover 
an accidental scenario estimated according to the environmental risk assessment.   
The procedure by which the amount of the financial guarantee shall be determined by 
the operator is specified in Article 33 of Royal Decree 183/2015. This process 
comprises the following steps: [9] 
Identify accidental scenarios and determine the likelihood of each scenario. 
• Estimation of EDI associated with each accidental scenario following the steps 
set out in Annex III of Royal Decree 183/2015. 
• Calculation of the risk associated to each accidental scenario as the product of 
the probability of the scenario and the EDI.  
• Sort accident scenarios in descending order of EDI and calculate the 
accumulated risk. The scenario which accumulates 95% of the total risk is 
selected. 
• Finally, the financial guarantee is calculated based on the reference scenario, as 
indicated in Article 33 of Royal Decree 183/2015. 
The EROM procedure performs the task of calculating the replacement value of the 
natural resources covered by the environmental responsibility law (soil, water, habitat, 
species and sea and river shore), applying economic methods based on the offer curve.  
The calculation included the following steps: 
2.7.1. Damage Characterization 
EROM analyzes the different actions that would be necessary to implement 
each of the different scenarios of the environmental damage and valorizes their 
repairing costs. These parameters are divided in 4 blocks: [10] 
• Damage Localization:  in this section EROM established all the characteristic of 
the affected area such as: permeability, slope, aquifer presence, accessibility, 
soil use, species, tree age, density, infiltration risk, protected area. 
• Damage source agent: this part classifies the agent that affect the environment 
in chemical (Halogenated VOC, Non halogenated VOC, Halogenated SVOC, Non 
halogenated SVOC, Diesel and NVOC, Inorganic substances, explosives). 
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physical (extraction/disappearance, Inert spill, Temperature), fire and biological 
(genetically modified organisms, invasive exotic species, virus and bacteries, 
insects and fungus). 
• Quantification of Damage:  it is necessary to pin down and estimate the 
amount of each resource (water, soil, marine bed, river and sea shore, habitat 
and species) that would be affected by each damage source agent.  
• Reversibility of damage: EROM performs calculations of the replacement costs 
separately for reversible damage and irreversible damage, not admitting losses 
of mixed type. This distinction is made in order to calculate separately primary 
and compensatory repair.   
2.7.2. Reparation techniques 
EROM procedure defined control and reparation techniques to be applied in 
the moment when the reference scenario happens. Reparation techniques aim to 
recover the soil, water, wildlife, habitats, and the sea and the estuaries of the damage 
caused by chemical, physical, biological and fire agents, Information on reparation 
techniques can be obtained simultaneously on two main sources: specialized literature 
and consultations experts from the Central and Regional Administrations, Some of 
reparation techniques are: landfarming, mechanical recollection on water surfaces, 
breeding wildlife rehabilitation centers, soil replacement and others.  [10] 
2.7.3. Calculation of financial value of Damage  
According to EROM methodology, the cost of the project comprise: [10] 
• Budget Elaboration:  For the reparation cost. EROM includes the following 
items: consulting cost. access. execution. control and review and security 
contingency percentage.  
• Cost of prevention and avoidance: it can be estimated as a percentage of 
primary repairs, being at least 10%. 
• Cost of remedial measures: it includes consulting (drafting of repair), access 
(construction of access roads), execution (implementation of restorative 
technique) and follow-up (checking and control) 
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3. OBJETIVES 
The main objective of this project is to apply the environmental risk assessment 
methodology to a liquefied Natural Gas installation according to Spanish legislation, 
accomplishing the following sub-objectives.  
• Identify environmental hazards, initiating events and accident scenarios in a 
typical LNG installation. 
• Apply Environmental Damage Index (EDI) Methodology to estimate the 
severity of each accident scenario identified. 
• Calculate the Risk for each identified scenario and select the reference 
scenario according to EDI. 
• Calculate the financial amount related to the reference scenario using the 
Environmental Responsibility Offer Model (EROM) methodology. 
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ANALISYS 
The methodology chosen for the analysis and evaluation of environmental risk 
assessment has been the UNE 150.008: 2008. The methodology provides two phases 
for risk analysis: the definition of the initiating event causes and the determination of 
the accidental scenarios.  To complete both phases, the following information must be 
compiled to perform the evaluation. 
4.1. Plant Location  
To evaluate the affectation of each possible accident occurring in the plant, it is 
important to identify the area where the plant is built and the surroundings 
characteristics. For this study, a LNG plant is taken by example with following 
environmental specifications: 
• Constructed on artificial ground gained to see. Possible seawater affectation 
but do not affect underground waters and soil.  
• Not forest areas near to the site. For this reason, any potential scenario that 
could affect forest areas is discarded.  
• Meteorological condition could not promote the formation of a flammable or 
toxic cloud that affects surroundings areas like atmosphere or forest. 
• There is a Protected Natural Area near from site and some threatened animal 
species around.  
 
4.2. Area Classification 
According to the EDI methodology, in order to identify the most likely causes of 
accidents, there have been identified potential risk zones, enabling to identify the 
most relevant sources of hazards that can trigger each event initiator accident. For this 
reason, the LNG plant was divided as follow:   
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Table 2 LNG Plant area classification 
Area 
ID 
Plant Area Critical operational activity 
Hazardous chemical 
substance 
1 
Loading, unloading, THT 
dosage and natural gas(NG) 
pipeline network 
High pressure process: NG 
distribution to pipeline network 
at 80 barg. 
Natural Gas and 
Tetrahydrothiophene 
(THT) 
2 Diesel Storage area Storage and distribution of 
diesel to the fire water 
emergency pumps and 
emergency electrical power 
generator.  
Diesel 
3 LNG tank loading LNG truck loading with high 
daily frequency. 
LNG 
4  Evaporators LNG phase changing at high 
pressure (80 barg) 
LNG / NG 
5 Seawater pumps and 
electrochlorination plant 
Seawater suction from sea. 
water treatment and 
electrochlorination system. 
Sodium Hypochlorite. 
sodium bisulfite and 
hydrochloric acid 
6 Compressor room. 
reliquefier and secondary 
pumps. 
High pressure system and 
rotative equipments. 
LNG / NG 
7  Loading / offloading 
tankers and LNG storage. 
Loading and unloading of LNG 
from/to tankers at cryogenic 
temperatures.   
Hydraulic oil. LNG. 
8 Electrical substation, 
transformers and 
emergency generator. 
Electrical current distribution.  Dielectric oil 
9 Chemical substances and 
lubricants warehouse.  
Hazardous chemicals storage.  Hydraulic oil. LNG. 
 
Figure 8 shows the typical layout of a LNG plant with the above mentioned areas. 
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Figure 8  Identification of operational area in a Plant layout example (numeration according 
plant classification explained before) 
 
4.3. Chemical substances identification 
Special attention is given to chemical substances classified as hazardous for the 
environment (section E) or affected by the 5 "H phrases" of European Regulation 
1272/2008 (CLP), which are: H400 (very toxic to aquatic organisms), H410 (very toxic 
to aquatic life with long lasting effects), H411 (toxic to aquatic life with long lasting 
effects), H412 (harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects), H413 (may be harmful 
to aquatic life with long lasting effects) Table 3 summarizes the hazardous chemical 
substances identified in the installation.  
Table 3 Hazardous Substances identified 
Chemical 
Substance 
Hazard 
Statement  
Environmental affectation 
Atmosp
here 
Soil Water  
Natural Gas H220 
Extremely flammable gas, fire or 
explosions production, Forest 
fires. 
x -- -- 
Sodic  
hypochlorit
e 
H314 
H400 
Flammable substance, hazardous 
for aquatic environment, 
corrosive and harmful. 
-- -- x 
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Table 3 Hazardous Substances identified 
Chemical 
Substance 
Hazard 
Statement  
Environmental affectation 
Atmosp
here 
Soil Water  
Sodium 
bisulfite 
H302 
H314 
H318 
Flammable substance, hazardous 
for aquatic environment, 
corrosive and harmful. 
-- -- x 
Diesel, 
Hydraulic 
Oil 
H226 
H304 
H332 
H315 
H351 
H411 
  
Flammable liquid and gases, 
Toxic to aquatic life with long 
lasting effects and soil 
affectation. 
  
  
-- x x 
Hydrochlori
c Acid 
H314 
H335 
H331 
Hazardous for aquatic 
ecosystems, corrosive and 
harmful. 
-- -- x 
 
Table 4 resumes the hazardous sources identified for each risk area, Usually, a 
risk scenario involves a chemical substance that could generate an initiating event with 
the possibility to generate explosive atmospheres, fire or any potential environmental 
damage condition, Also there are other hazardous condition generators such as: high 
pressure, electricity or human operations.  
Table 4 Hazardous Source Identified by zone 
Zone 
Code 
Zone Hazardous Source 
1 
Loading, unloading, TSH dosage and sending 
GN basic gas pipeline network 
Natural Gas (NG) 
Tetrahydrothiophene 
High pressure system 
2 Diesel Storage Diesel 
3 
LNG tank loading 
Liquefied Natural Gas 
High pressure process 
Constant human operational 
procedure.  
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Table 4 Hazardous Source Identified by zone 
Zone 
Code 
Zone Hazardous Source 
4 Evaporators 
NG 
LNG 
Phase Change  
High pressure process 
5 Seawater pumps and electrochlorination 
plant 
Diesel 
HCl (6%) 
HCl (<3%) 
NaHSO3 
NaOCl 
Electricity 
6 
Compressor room, reliquefier and secondary 
pumps. 
Natural Gas 
Liquefied Natural Gas              
High Pressure Process 
7 Loading / offloading tankers and LNG storage 
Natural Gas 
Liquefied Natural Gas 
Cryogenic Process 
8 
Electrical substation, transformers and 
emergency generator 
Diesel 
Dielectric Oil 
Electricity 
9 Storage of chemicals and lubricants Various chemicals 
 
 
4.4. Identifying accident initiating events 
The accident initiating events are physical facts able to generate an incident or 
accident in term of its evolution in space and time. 
Table 5 shows accident initiating events identified in the plant according to the 
SEDIGAS methodology [11] given the danger of the substances handled, storage areas 
and process and operating conditions of the various facilities. 
 
Table 5  Initiating Events identified in each area 
Area / System Initiating Event 
Vessel loading / Unloading 
LNG leakage during loading/unloading of a methane 
vessel 
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Table 5  Initiating Events identified in each area 
Area / System Initiating Event 
Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of a loading/unloading 
arm 
GNL Storage tanks LNG leakage from 36” loading pipeline to storage tanks 
Secondary Pumps LNG leakage from 20” secondary pumps manifold  
LNG Truck loading system LNG leakage during loading operation of a cistern truck 
NG system (Evaporators, 
Measurement station) 
NG leakage in measurement station pipeline 
Odorization System 
THT leakage in Odorization system storage tank 
THT leakage in distribution pipeline 
THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 
Seawater System 
Sodium bisulfite leakage in storage tank 
HCL leakage in storage tank 
Sodium hypochlorite leakage in storage tank 
Diesel leakage in firewater pumps storage tank 
Diesel storage 
Diesel leakage in storage tank 
Diesel leakage in distribution pipeline 
Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 
Electrical Station 
Dielectric oil leakage in station 
Fire in station 
Diesel leakage in Emergency pumps storage tank 
Chemical substances 
warehouse 
Chemical product leakage in warehouse 
Fire in warehouse 
 
4.5. Determination of frequency of initiating events of an accident 
Having identified the accident initiating events, the next step is the evaluation 
of their probabilities of occurrence. Initiating events can be considered as basic or 
specific, depending of the specialization of the plant or the equipment.  
For basic initiator events, the frequency of occurrence can be assessed directly 
by literature sources without resorting to quantification by fault tree.  
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Table 6 Frequency of initiating events [7] [6] 
Event Frequency (years
-1
) 
1.- Human error / Operator in observation (Not observed) 1.00E-02 
2.- Human error / Operator in action (Not act) 1.00E-03 
3. - Total pipeline rupture      D < 3” (Freq. Length line) 1.00E-06 
4. - Total pipeline rupture      3” < D < 6” (Freq. Length line) 3.00E-07 
5. - Total pipeline rupture     D > 6”   (Freq. Length line) 1.00E-07 
6.- Instantaneous release of a simple wall atmospheric tank  5.00E-06 
7.- Instantaneous release of a double wall atmospheric 
tank  
1.25E-08 
8.- Instantaneous release of a pressurized tank 5.00E-07 
9.-  Instantaneous release of an atmospheric cistern truck 1.00E-05 
10.- Instantaneous release of a pressurized cistern truck  5.00E-07 
11.- Continuous release orifice  1.00E-04 
12.- Release by orifice from underground tank  1.00E-08 
13.- Release by orifice from pressurized tank  1.00E-05 
14.- Hose rupture  (Freq. h-1) 4.00E-06 
15.- Arm rupture (Freq. h-1) 3.00E-08 
16.- Error in containers manipulation(by Nº of containers) 1.00E-05 
17.- Fire in warehouse (Freq. by M2 of warehouse) 1.00E-03 
18.- Short circuit     (Freq. h
-1
) 1.00E-06 
19.- Instrumentation failure   (Freq. h-1) 1.00E-06 
20.- Pump failure 1.00E-04 
21.- Hand valve failure 1.33E-03 
22.- Motorized valve 2.63E-03 
23.- inadequate construction 1.00E-06 
 
When a specific initiating event needs previously events to occur, involving 
different types of elements (safety devices, technical components, operators, etc.), a 
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methodology is required to analyze the different mechanisms and to determine the 
cause and probability of the event happens. In this case the Fault Tree methodology is 
used for this kind of situations, as it was described in chapter 2.  
 Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the fault tree used for “Diesel Spill during truck 
discharges” and “Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of unloading/loading arm”. Other 
fault trees used in this study are shown in Appendix II. 
 
Figure 9 Fault Tree analysis: “Diesel Spill during truck discharges” 
 
Diesel Spill during truck
discharge
Occurs leakage
Human error
(Dont act)
Hose Failure
Instantaneus Tank
wagon spill
Discharge Happen
1.00E -3 actions-1 3.50E-2 year-1
1.14E-4 year-1
OR
1.00E-5 year-1
Operational conditions:
No download / year: 1
Duration shock: 1 h
No hoses: 1
Human error. Operator does not act 
closing valve to the cistern when hose 
rupture occur
AND
5.14E-9 
times/ year-1
AND
Occurs leakage
through tank valve
3.50E-5 year-1
4.50E-5 year-1
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Figure 10 Fault Tree analysis: “Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of loading/unloading arm” 
 
According to the fault tree analysis, Table 7 shows the frequency calculated for 
each initiating event. The Appendix III shows the detailed calculation for each initiating 
event. In all the cases, the procedure was the following:  
• Description of initiating event. 
• Generic frequency of the initiating event of an accident. 
• Features: specific of the process characteristics: annual operating hours, time 
of the tanker at the facility, average length of a discharge / charge, length of 
pipe, etc., i.e. data operation installation, which are specified in this section. 
• Resulting frequency of the initiating event of an accident. 
 
 
AND
Hydraulic oil leakage
for rupture of a
loading/unloading
arm
Arm rupture
Discharge Happens
1.27E-4 
times/ year-1
2.63E-4 yeat-1
Operational conditions:
Annual operating hours: 4244 h
No downloads / year: 104
Download duration: 12 hours
No. liquid arms: 3
No load / year: 10
Duration charging: 50 h
No. liquid arms: 1
or
Loading Happens
Arm on operation 4.84E-1 year-1
4.27E-1 year-1 5.70E-2 year-1
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Table 7 Established scenarios /initiating event frequency calculated 
Zone 
Code 
Initiating 
Event 
Code 
Initiating Event Description 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
1 
1.1 
LNG leakage during loading/unloading of a 
methane vessel 
1.27E-04 
1.2 
Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of a 
loading/unloading arm 
1.80E-04 
2 2.1 
LNG leakage from 36” loading pipeline to 
storage tanks 
5.98E-07 
3 
3.1 
LNG leakage from 20” secondary pumps 
manifold 
3.70E-06 
3.2 
LNG leakage during loading operation of a 
cistern truck 
4.96E-02 
4 4.1 NG leakage in measurement station pipeline 1.40E-04 
5 
5.1 THT leakage in Odorization system storage tank 1.15E-04 
5.2 THT leakage in distribution pipeline 5.00E-05 
5.3 
THT leakage during operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
1.74E-09 
6 
6.1 Sodium bisulfite leakage in storage tank 1.15E-04 
6.2 
Sodium bisulfite leakage  during operation of 
cistern tank unloading 
1.59E-07 
6.3 HCL leakage in storage tank 5.00E-06 
6.4 Sodium hypochlorite leakage in storage tank 5.00E-06 
6.5 Diesel leakage in firewater pumps tank 1.25E-08 
7 
7.1 Diesel leakage in main tank 1.15E-04 
7.2 Diesel leakage in distribution pipeline 2.30E-04 
7.3 
Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
5.15E-09 
8 
8.1 Diesel leakage in emergency generator tank 1.25E-08 
8.2 Fire in electrical substation 8.76E-03 
9 9.1 Fire in warehouse 8.80E-04 
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4.6. Chemical spilled and firewater volume calculation 
After identification of initiating events and visual inspection in the LNG plant 
installation, it is necessary to determine the spill conditions and firewater volume to 
calculate the quantity of chemicals that will affect the environment. In this ERA are 
detailed three substances in order to calculate all the spills and fire scenarios. In case 
of hazardous inorganic substances (Sodium bisulfite, Sodium Hypochlorite and 
Hydrochloric acid), the EDI methodology consider the self-regeneration of the marine 
medium for infinite dilution of the substances [8, 10]. Table 8 shows the properties of 
hazardous chemical substances to evaluate during the damage quantification.  
Table 8  Hazardous Chemical substances properties [1] 
Chemical Substance 
Density  
(kg/m
3
) 
Combustion rate 
(kg/m
2
.s) 
Flash Point 
(ºC) 
THT 1000 0.052 13 
Diesel 850 0.081 52 
Hydraulic oil 868 No evaluated >55 
The magnitude of the accident scenarios is associated with the amount of 
hazardous chemical substances spilled to seawater. 
The calculation was made taking into account the following considerations: 
• Volume determination of lines, reservoirs and storage tanks where the spill 
scenarios is estimated. 
• Volume determination of cistern truck leakage during unloading of dangerous 
chemicals (THT and diesel). 
• Calculation of water volume required for each fire accident where the 
hazardous substance could be dragged to sea by the fire-water. 
 
4.6.1. Pipelines volume calculation  
To calculate the volume release in each accidental scenario where the initiating 
event is a pipeline rupture, the following criteria have been considered: 
• THT pipeline: total release of the entire pipeline volume between main tank 
and daily tank.  
• Diesel pipeline: Total distribution diesel system pipeline.  
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• Hydraulic oil Circuit:  total circuit discharge. 
The following tables show the calculated volume for initiating event: 
Table 9 Calculated volume of pipeline systems  
Code Initiating event 
Length 
(m) 
Diameter 
(in) 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
5.2 THT leakage in distribution pipeline 50 0.75 0.01 
7.2 
Diesel leakage in distribution 
pipeline 
230 2 0.47 
 
Table 10  Volume of a hydraulic system in a LNG Plant. 
Code Initiating event Volume (m
3
) 
1.2 Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of a loading/unloading arm 0.45* 
*Hydraulic oil volume of the LNG plant under analysis.  
4.6.2. Cistern tank volume 
Cistern tank volume estimation is taken by reference of common tanks used in 
Spain for this activity. Table 11 shows the volumes taken as a reference for this study: 
Table 11 Typical volume of cistern tank of THT and Diesel 
  Code Initiating event Volume (m
3
) 
5.3 THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 15 
7.3 Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 15 
4.6.3. Firewater volume calculation 
In case of pool fire of flammable chemical spill, fire water was calculated 
according to the technical note “NTP 40” published by the Spain National Institute of 
Safety and Health at Work (INSHT), which sets the minimum water flow firefighting 4-
20 liters/min/ m2. [12].  
If the hazardous chemical leak occurs inside the tank dike, the area of fire is 
estimated like the free area where the substance is exposed to the atmosphere. 
Otherwise, if the hazardous chemical leak occurs in unconfined area, it has been 
considered a thickness of 10 mm of the puddle until reaching the spill, and its area can 
be calculated by Ec.1. Table 12 shows the area calculated for each initiating event 
where occurring as unconfined spill.  
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 !""#    $/&     Ec.2 
Where: 
A= Spill Area (m
2
) 
h= Spill thickness (m) 
V= Spill volume (m
3
) 
 
Table 12 Area calculated for unconfined spill of THT and Diesel 
  Code Initiating event Spill Area (m
2
) 
5.2 THT leakage in distribution pipeline 1.43 
5.3 THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 1500 
7.2 Diesel leakage in distribution pipeline 46.62 
7.3 Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 1500 
 
Also the calculated free areas for the spills that occur inside the dike of the 
storage tank are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13   Dike area calculation for confined spills. 
Tank 
Tank 
volume  
(m
3
) 
Average filling 
level (*) (%) 
Tank 
Diameter 
(m) 
Dike surface 
(m
2
) 
Free Dike 
surface 
(m
2
) 
Dike 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
THT 20.98 50 2 39.13 39.13* 25.43 
Diesel 44 40 3 49 41.93 43.61 
*Cylindrical tank over the ground. 
The duration of fire is calculated according to the formula [12]: 
'( 
)*
+,-
 Ec.3 
Where: 
T (s) = Fire duration, seconds. 
Mp = Mass of chemical spilled, kg. 
Ad = Surface area of the basin or spill, m2. 
Vc = Burning rate, kg/m2.s 
Firewater volume is calculated according to the formula [12]: 
$."/0  1  '  20
4
5.57
  Ec.4 
Where: 
T(s) = Fire duration, seconds. 
Ad = Spill Surface or tank basin free area where fire is happened m
2
. 
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Consequently the spilled volume is calculated as follow: 
 
Firewater + Chemical 
substances discharge into 
sea (m
3
) 
= Chemical 
Substance 
Spilled 
(m
3
) 
+ Firewater 
volume 
(m
3
) 
- Dike 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
Ec.5 
 
 
Table 14  Firewater calculation for each initiating event 
COD Initiating Event 
Chemical 
Substance 
Spilled 
(m
3
) 
Fire 
Duration 
(min)* 
Firewate
r volume 
(m
3
) 
Firewater + 
Chemical 
substances 
discharge into 
sea 
4.1 
NG leakage in measurement 
station pipeline (THT tank 
affectation, jetfire)   
10 82.46 65.82 50.39 
4.1 
NG leakage in measurement 
station pipeline (Diesel tank 
affectation. jetfire)   
18 75.08 64.22 38.61 
5.1 
THT leakage in Odorization 
system storage tank 
10 82.46 65.82 50.39 
5.2 
THT leakage in distribution 
pipeline 
0.01 - - - 
5.3 
THT leakage during operation of 
cistern tank unloading 
15 3.23 2.58 - 
6.4 
Diesel leakage in firewater pumps 
tank 
9 2.058 - - 
7.1 Diesel leakage in main tank 18 75.08 64.22 38.61 
7.2 
Diesel leakage in distribution 
pipeline 
0.47 0.1 - - 
7.3 
Diesel leakage during operation 
of cistern tank unloading 
15 60 - - 
8.1 
Diesel leakage in emergency 
generator tank 
2.7 1.75 - - 
*According to NTP 40, the firewater is calculated when the fire duration is more than 60 
minutes [12]. 
4.7. Evolution of initiating event into environmental accident 
This section is intended to quantify the probability of environmental accidents 
coming from the evolution of initiating event by event tree.  
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• Ignition probability: is the probability of a direct or indirect ignition. For this. 
TNO has specified the classification according to substance category, see Table 
15. 
• Human intervention: in case of the event happens, is the probability that the 
operator can apply procedures to avoid the final accident. For TNO 1.00 E-3 [7] 
• Fire system activation: 95% of availability [7]. 
 
Table 15 Ignition likelihood according substance category [7, 6] 
Substance 
Category 
Continuous 
flow source 
Instantaneous source Probability 
immediate ignition 
Category 0 
Average / High 
Reactivity 
< 10 kg/s 
10 - 100 Kg/s 
> 100 kg/s 
< 1000 kg 
1000 - 10000 kg 
> 10000  kg 
0.2 
0.5 
0.7 
Category 0 
Low reactivity 
< 10 kg/s 
10 - 100 Kg/s 
> 100 kg/s 
< 1000 kg 
1000 - 10000 kg 
> 10000  kg 
0.02 
0.04 
0.09 
Category 1 All flow range All leakage quantities 0.065 
Category 2 All flow range All leakage quantities 0.01 
Category 3.4 All flow range All leakage quantities 0 
 
Continuing to the event tree progress, follow figures show an event tree for each 
representative initiating event. Other event trees are shown in Appendix IV. 
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2
CO
D 
Initiating Event A B C D Environmental Accidental Scenario   
A Instantaneous Ignition P=0.04                   
B Delayed Ignition  P= 1-0.04 = 0,96         
Jet Fire affecting following tanks: 
1.- Diesel main tank: Diesel discharge into the sea *  
2- THT main tank: THT discharge into the sea ** 
  
C Hazardous Chemical substance tank affectation P=0.3     P4 0.95   
D Fire system activation P = 0.95             
              P3 0.3       
      P1 0.04                  Spill Volume   
                      Frequency (Years-1) 1.60E-06 Diesel  18,00   
                          THT  6,65   
                      Pool fire into THT or Diesel tank dike. Thermal 
radiation will not affect others installation for the 
domino effect. Forest areas will not be affected also. 
  
                  1-P4 0.05   
4.1 NG leakage in 
measurement station 
pipeline 
                  
                  
Frequency (Years-1) 
8.40E-08   
  
Frequency 
(years
 -1
) 
1.40E-04 
        1-P3 0.7     
Jet fire without affect any storage tank of hazardous 
chemical substances. 
  
                        
                      Frequency (Years-1) 3.92E-06   
          P2 0.96         Flash fire without affect any storage tank of 
hazardous chemical substances. 
  
                        
      1-P1 0.96             Frequency (Years-1) 1.29E-04   
          1-P2 0.04         Dispersion and dilution of the flammable cloud 
without consequences to the environment.  
  
                        
                      
Frequency (Years-1) 
5.37E-06 
  
  
* Because diesel + firewater overflow the tank dike, and drag of diesel through the rainy water channel to sea. 
** Because THT + firewater overflow the tank dike, and drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea.  
        
 Frequency calculation example:  1.4E-04*P1*P3*P4 = 1.4E-04*0.04*0.3*0.95 = 1.60E-06   (Diesel main tank: Diesel discharge into the sea)   
   
Figure 16 NG leakages in measurement station pipeline event tree    
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COD Initiating Event Instantaneous 
Ignition 
Fire 
protection 
system 
activation 
Rainy valves 
closed 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
                                             
THT discharge into the sea because THT+firewater overflow the retention 
system, and drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea.  
 
              P3 0.999  
                   
          P2 0.95     Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1.07E-10 12.89  
                  THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea.  
 
      P1 0.065     1-P3 0.001  
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1.08E-13 15.00  
          1-P2 0.05     
Pool fire into THT retention system and surroundings. Thermal radiation will 
not affect others installation for the domino effect. Forest areas will not be 
affected also. 
 
5.3 THT leakages during 
operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
             
              
 
  Frequency  1.74E-09              Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
  (years -1)                 5.66E-12 0.00  
                  THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea.  
 
              P4 0.999  
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
      1-P1 0.935         1.63E-09 12.89  
                  THT discharge into the sea because the retention system is overflow. A THT 
cloud will not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
 
              1-P4 0.001  
                   
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1.63E-12 15.00  
Frequency calculation example:  1.74E-04*P1*(1-P2) = 1.74E-04*0.065*(1-0.95) = 5.66E-12   (THT discharge into the sea because firewater…) 
Figure 17    THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading Event Tree 
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4
COD Initiating Event Instantaneous Ignition 
Fire protection 
system activation 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
                       
              Diesel discharges into the sea because Diesel + 
firewater overflow the tank dike, and drag of 
Diesel through the rainy water channel to sea.  
 
          P2 0,95  
               
      P1 0,01     Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              1,09E-06 18,00  
            
                       
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire into Diesel tank dike. Thermal 
radiation will not affect others installation for 
the domino effect. Forest areas will not be 
affected also. 
 
7.1 Diesel leakage in main tank          
  
Frequency (years 
-1
) 1,15E-04 
        
 
              Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              5,75E-08 0,00  
            
              
The retention basin is watertight. A THT cloud 
will not generate a concentration between LEL 
- UEL range that could generate a flash fire 
and affect other equipments.  
 
      1-P1 0,99      
               
               
              Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              1,14E-04 0.00  
          
Frequency calculation example:  1.15E-04*P1*(1-P2) = 1.15E-04*0.01*(1-0.05) = 5.75E-08 (Pool fire into Diesel tank dike …) 
Figure 18  Diesel leakages in main tank Event tree 
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After developing each event tree according an initiating event selected. Table 
16 shows the environmental accidental scenarios founded and their Frequency and 
probability of occurrence.  
Table 16 Environmental Accidental Scenarios Identified 
COD Initiating Event Frequency  
(years
-1
) 
EAS 
COD 
Environmental Accidental 
Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequenc
y (times/ 
year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m3) 
1.2 
Hydraulic oil 
leakage for 
rupture of a 
loading/unloadin
g arm 
1.80E-04 1.2.A Hydraulic oil spill to the sea 1.80E-04 0.45 
4.1 
NG leakage in 
measurement 
station pipeline 
1.40E-04 
4.1.A 
Jet Fire affecting following Diesel 
main tank: Diesel discharge into 
the sea   
1.60E-06 18.00 
4.1.B 
Jet Fire affecting THT main tank: 
THT discharges into the sea  
1.60E-06 6.65 
5.1 
THT leakage in 
Odorization 
system storage 
tank 
1.15E-04 5.1.A 
THT discharges into the sea 
because THT+ firewater overflow 
the tank dike and drag of THT 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
7.10E-06 6.65 
5.2 
THT leakage in 
distribution 
pipeline 
5.00E-05 
5.2.A 
THT discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag THT 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
3.09E-06 0.01 
5.2.B 
THT discharges into the sea 
through the rainy water channel. 
A THT cloud will not generate a 
concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
4.68E-05 0.01 
5.3 
THT leakage 
during operation 
of cistern tank 
unloading 
1.74E-09 
5.3.A 
THT discharges into the sea 
because THT + firewater overflow 
the retention system and drag of 
THT through the rainy water 
channel to sea.  
1.07E-10 12.89 
5.3.B 
THT discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag THT 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
1.08E-13 15.00 
5.3.C 
THT discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag THT 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
1.63E-09 12.89 
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Table 16 Environmental Accidental Scenarios Identified 
COD Initiating Event Frequency  
(years
-1
) 
EAS 
COD 
Environmental Accidental 
Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequenc
y (times/ 
year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m3) 
 
THT discharges into the sea 
because the retention system is 
overflow. A THT cloud will not 
generate a concentration between 
LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect 
other equipments. 
1.63E-12 15.00 
6.2 
Sodium bisulfite 
leakage  during 
operation of 
cistern tank 
unloading 
1.59E-07 6.2.A 
Sodium bisulfite discharges into 
the sea 
1.59E-10 15.00 
6.5 
Diesel leakage in 
firewater pumps 
tank 
1.25E-08 
6.5.A 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag Diesel 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea. 
1.19E-10 9.00 
6.5.B 
Diesel discharges into the see 
through rainy channels. A diesel 
flammable cloud will not generate 
a concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
1.24E-08 9.00 
7.1 
Diesel leakage in 
main tank 
1.15E-04 7.1.A 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
because Diesel+ firewater 
overflow the tank dike and drag of 
Diesel through the rainy water 
channel to sea. 
1.09E-06 18.00 
7.2 
Diesel leakage in 
distribution 
pipeline 
2.30E-04 
7.2.A 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag Diesel 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea. 
2.19E-06 0.47 
7.2.B 
Pool fire in surroundings. Thermal 
radiation will not affect others 
installation for the domino effect. 
Forest areas will not be affected 
also. 
1.15E-07 0.00 
7.2.C 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
through the rainy water channel. 
A cloud will not generate a 
concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
2.28E-04 0.47 
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Table 16 Environmental Accidental Scenarios Identified 
COD Initiating Event Frequency  
(years
-1
) 
EAS 
COD 
Environmental Accidental 
Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequenc
y (times/ 
year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m3) 
7.3 
Diesel leakage 
during operation 
of cistern tank 
unloading 
5.14E-09 
7.3.A 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag Diesel 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea. 
4.88E-11 15.00 
7.3.B 
Diesel discharges into the see 
through rainy channels.  A diesel 
flammable cloud will not generate 
a concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
5.09E-09 15.00 
8.1 
Diesel leakage in 
emergency 
generator tank 
1.25E-08 
8.1.A 
Diesel discharges into the sea 
because firewater will drag Diesel 
through the rainy water channel 
to sea. 
1.19E-10 9.00 
8.1.B 
Diesel discharges into the see 
through rainy channels. A diesel 
flammable cloud will not generate 
a concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
1.24E-08 9.00 
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5. ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE INDEX ESTIMATION 
Environmental Damage Index (EDI) assigns an order of magnitude to the 
damage caused by each accidental scenario presented. Thus it allows ranking the 
importance of each potential damage.  
The EDI calculation procedure is specified in Royal Decree 183/2015, which 
modified the law 26/2007 of Environmental Responsibility, developed by Royal Decree 
2090/2008. 
As explained in chapter 2, the EDI methodology is based on a mathematical 
equation that provides semi-quantitative estimation of environmental damage. The 
input parameters are function of the combination damage source agent – natural 
resource being evaluated. In particular, Royal Decree 183/2015 shows a total of twenty 
one groups of Hazard - natural resource partners.  
According to event trees where marine water is polluted by hazardous 
substance such as THT, diesel and hydraulic oil. EDI methodology defines groups 1 
(Marine water –chemical substances) to develop the calculation, as shows in Figure 7 
(Chapter 2). Also, group 16 (Animal Species/Chemical substances) is included in the EDI 
evaluation because it is estimated to affect seabird species in surrounding.  
5.1. EDI parameters selection and calculation procedure 
As shown in chapter 2, EDI formula is defined as follow: 
  ∑ 	
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Ecf= Fix cost estimation 
A. B. C= EDI modificators 
Ecu=Unit cost estimation 
Macc= Quantitive of resource affected.  
q. p= resource EDI modification parameter. 
Ecr=Project control and review cost. 
Ecc= Reparation consulting cost. 
β= Distant from nearest access road. 
Eca= Access to the damage area cost. 
n= groups evaluated 
 
To apply the EDI calculation comprises the following steps: 
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• Select the damage source agent / Resource affected (group) 
• Choose all the parameters values and calculate the modifiers A,B and C.  
• Identify Ecu, α, β, Macc, Ecr, Ecc and Eca for each group.  
• For each group affected and variables selected, apply EDI formula. 
• Sum each EDI results and obtained the global EDI value for the accidental 
scenario selected.  
• Apply this procedure for each accidental scenario.  
The parameters to evaluate each environmental accident identified in EDI 
Methodology are given bellow: 
Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 show the basic parameters defined to group 1 and 16. 
Table 17 Group 1(Marine Water – Chemical Substances) equation coefficients and modifiers 
[13] 
Agent 
Coefficients Modifiers 
Ecf Ecu α* Ec Ecr Ecc p Macc q MA MB MC 
VOC & SVOC 0 866 Mspilled 1 1934 0.03 0 0 0 
 - 
MB1 
MB12 
MB18 
MC
1 Fuel oil and NVOC 0 3648 Mspilled 1 1934 0.03 0 0 0 
*Mspilled: ton of chemical substance spilled 
Table 18  Group 16 (Animal Species/Chemical substances)equation coefficients and modifiers 
[13] 
Resource Coefficients Modifiers 
Ecf Ecu α Ec Ecr Ecc p Macc q MA MB MC 
Threat bird Species 
0 11866 R 0.5 6027 0.03 0 0 0 
MA2 
MB1 
MB2 
MB15 
MC
5 Not Threat bird 
Species 
0 2373 R 1 6027 0.03 0 0 0 
 
Table 19 Calculation range of R coefficient to estimate α value in group 16 [13] 
Resource Range* R 
Threat bird Species 
0 ≤ Vspill ≤ 25 2xVspill 
Vspill > 25 50 
Not Threat bird Species 
0 ≤ Vspill ≤ 25 2xVspill 
Vspill > 25 50 
*Vspill: volume of chemical substance spilled 
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After select the principal parameters of EDI equation, Table 20 shows the 
necessary values to calculate A. B and C modificators. 
Table 20 Modifiers selected for EDI calculation of each environmental accidental scenario [8] 
Category Description Modifier Value 
Protected Natural Area 
affectation 
MA2 
Protected Natural Area affected MA2 1.25 
Protected Natural Area unaffected MA2 1.00 
Substance 
biodegrability 
MB1 ** 
Low   MB1 1.00 
Average MB1 0.90 
High  MB1 0.80 
Animal Population 
Density 
MB2 
High Dense (Many references about species 
presence in the area) 
MB2 2.00 
Average (some references about species 
presence in the area) 
MB2 1.50 
Sparse Average (few references about species 
presence in the area) 
MB2 1.00 
Solubility 
MB12 
Insoluble MB12 1.00 
Low solubility (Water solubility 20ºC between 
0.1 - 10 mg/l) 
MB12 0.90 
High Solubility ( Water solubility at 20ºC > 10 
mg/l) 
MB12 0.80 
Toxicity 
MB15 
High (More than 50% of population 
affectation) 
MB15 2.00 
Average (10-50% of population affectation) MB15 1.50 
Low  (Less than 1% of population affection) MB15 1.00 
Volatility 
MB18 
Low  (PE >  325ºC) MB18 1.00 
Average ( Bp 100 - 325 ºC) MB18 0.90 
High (Bp < 100 ºC MB18 0.80 
Duration 1 
MC1 
(Time lapse for water 
recovery)  
High ( > 1 year) MC1 1.25 
Medium ( 6 month - 1 year) MC1 1.10 
Low (< 6 month) MC1 1.00 
Duration 5 
MC5 
(Time lapse for animal 
species recovery) 
High (mammals affectation) MC5 1.25 
Low (other species affectation) MC5 1.00 
** Biodegradability parameter is evaluated according external information included in European 
Chemical Substances Information System.  
 
Choosing the hazardous substances involved in the study. Table 21 shows the 
parameters relative to damage agent.  
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Table 21 Parameter relative to damage agent  
Substance EDI Agent* 
biodegradability 
MB1 
Solubility 
MB12 
Toxicity 
MB15 
Volatility 
MB18 
THT SVOC Low  Insoluble  High  Medium 
Diesel NVOC Low  Insoluble  High  Low 
Hydraulic Oil NVOC Low  Insoluble  High  Low 
*SVOC: Semivolatile organic chemical substance.    NVOC: No volatile organic chemical substance 
Afterward, the possibility to affect a protected natural area (MA2) and seabird 
species (MB2) are expressed as: 
Table 22 Characteristic Parameters relative to surroundings [8] 
Parameter Value Justification 
Possible affectation of a 
protected natural area  (MA2) 
No 
Spill scenario occurs inside the port area. It is 
not estimated to affect any protected 
natural area in surroundings. It is estimated 
affect seabirds related to this area. 
Population density (MB2) 
(Apply to seabird  population) 
Very dense 
The standard ES0000148 and ES0000470 
have not information about population 
density of seabirds in this environment. To 
establish a principle of prudence. the 
population density is taken as " very dense " 
to encompass the scene of involvement 
completely  [14] 
 
Finally, modifiers for Groups 1 and 16 estipulate the duration parameters: " 
duration 1" (MC1) and “duration 5" (MC5), where collected the estimate time to 
recover the affected area or animal species. 
Table 23 Damage estimation parameter [8] 
Parameter Value Justification 
Duration 1 (MC1)  Group 1 
(Time lapse for water 
recovery) 
Low (< 6 month) 
It is estimated hazardous substance 
affectation bellow 6 month of 
recuperation. See Table 20 classification 
Duration 5 (MC5) Group 16 
(Time lapse for animal species 
recovery) 
Low (other species 
affectation) 
It is estimated affectation to seabirds. See 
Table 20 classification 
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Taking an example of EDI calculation, Table 24 shows the parameters selection 
and EDI evaluation for accidental scenario 7.1 “Diesel leakage in main tank”. The other 
EDI calculation reports are shown in appendix V 
Table 24 EDI Calculation for 7.1 Scenario (Diesel Leakage in main tank) 
Scenario 7.1.A Diesel leakage in main tank 
EDI Substance Diesel 
EDI Resource 
Marine Water Threat bird 
Species 
Not Threat bird 
Species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters 
Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 15.53 36.00 36.00 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marine bed 
Parameters 
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modifiers MA 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modifiers MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modifiers MC 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination by resource 
58353 886190 358171 
EDI  Scenario 1302715 
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After EDI calculation, Table 25 shows the results of frequency, Spill volume and 
EDI value for each accidental scenario. 
Table 25 EDI calculation for each environmental scenario 
COD Initiating 
Event 
ID Environmental 
Accidental Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m
3
) 
EDI 
1.2 Hydraulic oil 
leakage for 
rupture of a 
loading/unloading 
arm 
1.2.A Hydraulic oil spill to the sea 1.80E-04 0.45 51431 
4.1 NG leakage in 
measurement 
station pipeline 
4.1.A Jet Fire affecting following 
tanks: 
1.- Diesel main tank: Diesel 
discharge into the sea 
1.60E-06 18.00 1302715 
4.1.B Jet Fire affecting following 
tanks: 
1- THT main tank: THT 
discharge into the sea 
1.60E-06 6.65 499731 
5.1 THT leakage in 
Odorization 
system storage 
tank 
5.1.A THT discharge into the sea 
because THT + firewater 
overflow the tank dike and 
drag of THT through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
7.10E-06 6.65 499731 
5.2 THT leakage in 
distribution 
pipeline 
5.2.A THT discharge into the sea 
because firewater will drag 
THT through the rainy water 
channel to sea. 
3.09E-06 0.01 21946 
5.2.B THT discharge into the sea 
through the rainy water 
channel. A THT cloud will 
not generate a 
concentration between LEL - 
UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
4.68E-05 0.01 21946 
5.3 THT leakage 
during operation 
of cistern tank 
unloading 
5.3.A THT discharge into the sea 
because THT + firewater 
overflow the retention 
system and drag of THT 
through the rainy water 
channel to sea. 
1.07E-10 12.89 915196 
5.3.B THT discharge into the sea 
because firewater will drag 
THT through the rainy water 
channel to sea. 
1.08E-13 15.00 1053684 
5.3.C THT discharge into the sea 
because firewater will drag 
THT through the rainy water 
channel to sea. 
1.63E-09 12.89 915196 
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Table 25 EDI calculation for each environmental scenario 
COD Initiating 
Event 
ID Environmental 
Accidental Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m
3
) 
EDI 
5.3.D THT discharge into the sea 
because the retention 
system is overflow. A THT 
cloud will not generate a 
concentration between LEL - 
UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
1.63E-12 15.00 1053684 
6.5 Diesel leakage in 
firewater pumps 
tank 
6.5.A Diesel discharges into the 
sea because firewater will 
drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
1.19E-10 9.00 659125 
6.5.B Diesel discharge into the see 
through rainy channels. A 
diesel flammable cloud will 
not generate a 
concentration between LEL - 
UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
1.24E-08 9.00 659125 
7.1 Diesel leakage in 
main tank 
7.1.A Diesel discharge into the sea 
because Diesel+ firewater 
overflow the tank dike and 
drag of Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
1.09E-06 18.00 1303842 
7.2 Diesel leakage in 
distribution 
pipeline 
7.2.A Diesel discharges into the 
sea because firewater will 
drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
2.19E-06 0.47 37203 
7.2.B Diesel discharge into the sea 
through the rainy water 
channel. A cloud will not 
generate a concentration 
between LEL - UEL range 
that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other 
equipments. 
2.28E-04 0.47 37203 
7.3 Diesel leakage 
during operation 
of cistern tank 
unloading 
7.3.A Diesel discharges into the 
sea because firewater will 
drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
4.88E-11 15.00 1089550 
7.3.B Diesel discharge into the see 
through rainy channels.  A 
diesel flammable cloud will 
not generate a 
concentration between LEL - 
UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
5.09E-09 15.00 1089550 
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Table 25 EDI calculation for each environmental scenario 
COD Initiating 
Event 
ID Environmental 
Accidental Scenario (EAS) 
EAS 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Spill 
Vol. 
(m
3
) 
EDI 
8.1 Diesel leakage in 
emergency 
generator tank 
8.1.A Diesel discharges into the 
sea because firewater will 
drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
1.19E-10 9.00 659125 
8.1.B Diesel discharge into the see 
through rainy channels. A 
diesel flammable cloud will 
not generate a 
concentration between LEL - 
UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
1.24E-08 9.00 659125 
 
According to the results obtained and shown in Table 24 and Table 25, it is 
important to emphasize the relation between EDI value and damage source agent.  EDI 
values are directly proportional to the amount of damage source agent spilled (THT. 
diesel). In addition, threat species (seabird) gives highest EDI values because the 
possible disappearance of the species and irrecoverable damage to the ecosystem. 
Finally, Spain LNG industry has just been started to apply this EDI methodology in 2015 
for this reason; there are not environmental risk assessment done to compare the 
results obtained.  
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6. REFERENCE ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO SELECTION AND 
FINANCIAL GUARANTEE ESTIMATION 
This section details the methodology develop to search the reference scenario 
and its financial guarantee estimation.   
6.1. Selection of environmental accidental reference scenario 
The procedure to estimate the amount of the financial guarantee is specified in 
article 33 of Royal Decree 183/2015, Environmental Responsibility. This process 
comprises the following steps: 
• Identification of accident scenarios and determination of the probability of 
occurrence of each scenario. 
• Estimation of environmental damage index (EDI) associated to each 
environmental accidental scenario. EDI assigns a magnitude of the 
environmental impacts for each scenario (see Chapter IV). 
• Risk calculation associated to each accidental scenario as the product of the 
probability of the scenario and the EDI value.  
:!(;  <=#>#?@ Ec.6 
• Sort accident scenarios in descending order of EDI and calculate accumulated 
risk. Subsequently the reference scenario is that accumulating 95% of the total 
risk. 
• Finally, the amount of the financial guarantee of the reference scenario is 
calculated as indicated in Article 33 of Royal Decree 183/2015. 
Table 26 shows the resume of risk calculation and the reference scenario 
selection. 
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Table 26 Reference scenario identification according EDI Methodology 
 Code Chemical 
Substance 
EDI 
(dimensionl
ess) 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Risk 
(times/year) 
Relative 
Risk 
Accumulate 
Risk % 
Vol. 
Spilled 
(m
3
) 
 7.1.A Diesel 1.302.715 1.09E-06 1.42E+00 5.32% 100.00% 18.00 
4.1.A Diesel 1.302.715 1.60E-06 2.08E+00 7.77% 94.68% 18.00 
 7.3.A Diesel 1.089.550 4.88E-11 5.32E-05 0.00% 86.91% 15.00 
 7.3.B Diesel 1.089.550 5.09E-09 5.55E-03 0.02% 86.91% 15.00 
 5.3.B THT 1.053.684 1.08E-13 1.13E-07 0.001% 86.89% 15.00 
5.3.D THT 1.053.684 1.63E-12 1.72E-06 0.002% 86.89% 15.00 
 5.3.A THT 907.579 1.07E-10 9.75E-05 0.004% 86.89% 12.89 
 5.3.C THT 907.579 1.63E-09 1.48E-03 0.01% 86.89% 12.89 
6.5.A Diesel 659.125 1.19E-10 7.83E-05 0.003% 86.88% 9.00 
6.5.B Diesel 659.125 1.24E-08 8.16E-03 0.03% 86.88% 9.00 
 4.1.B THT 499.731 1.60E-06 7.97E-01 2.98% 86.85% 6.65 
 5.1.A THT 499.731 7.10E-06 3.55E+00 13.26% 83.87% 6.65 
 1.2.A Hydraulic Oil 51.431 1.80E-04 9.25E+00 34.56% 70.61% 0.45 
 7.2.A Diesel 37.203 2.19E-06 8.13E-02 0.30% 36.05% 0.47 
 7.2.B Diesel 37.203 2.28E-04 8.47E+00 31.66% 35.75% 0.47 
 5.2.A THT 21.946 3.09E-06 6.78E-02 0.25% 4.09% 0.01 
 5.2.B THT 21.946 4.68E-05 1.03E+00 3.83% 3.83% 0.01 
Total Risk 2.68E+01 
According to all above mentioned, 7.1.A scenario “Diesel leakage in principal 
tank “is selected to calculate the financial amount of guarantee.  
Table 27  Reference scenario selected 
COD Initiating 
Event 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
(EAS) 
EAS Frequency 
(times/year) 1.09E-06 
7.1.A Diesel 
leakage in 
main tank 
Diesel discharge into the sea because 
Diesel + firewater overflow the tank 
dike and drag of Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
EDI 1.303.842 
RISK 1.42E+00 
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6.2. Financial valuation of reference scenario 
The damage foreseen in the reference scenario should be valued economically 
to estimate the reparation scope and calculate the financial guarantee.  
6.2.1. Economic valuation of environmental damage  
Due to Royal Decree 183/2015, monetization of environmental damage will be 
made from the primary restoration project cost.  Environmental, food and agriculture 
Spain Ministry (MAGRAMA) offers the Environmental Responsibility Offer Model 
(EROM) to determine the financial evaluation of the potential environmental damage 
founded (Reference scenario). [10] 
In addition to the parameters defined in the EDI methodology, calculation of 
the financial by EROM must consider the following parameters: 
• Polluted water quantity 
• Proper technique to collect the hazardous substances in the sea. 
• Animal species affected.  
6.2.1.1. Polluted water quantity 
Polluted seawater calculation is estimated by the equilibrium characteristic of 
the spill on the water surface. USEPA (2001) suggests an average equilibrium thickness 
of oil over sea surface slick in temperate waters about 1E-3 inches. Finally, to calculate 
the volume of contaminated seawater, it is estimated 1 cm of depth under the spill 
surface.  
Table 28 Polluted seawater calculation 
Parameter Value Unit 
Spilled volume 18 m
3
 
Thickness film 0.001 in 
Affected surface  7.08E04 m
2
 
Depth affected 0.01 m 
Seawater affected 708 m
3
 
 
6.2.1.2. Recovery Technique  
For the damage caused by the chemical substance spilled. EROM procedure 
established the mechanical recollection like the best technique to apply in sceneries 
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where the substance is not miscible with water.  For EROM tool, the recovery of 18 m3 
of diesel spilled on sea takes less than one month. [10] 
6.2.1.3.   Animal species affected 
To estimate animal affectation, it is taken like reference a natural protected 
area to calculate approximately the population and common species that being part of 
this ecosystem. Marjal dels Moros is the selected area to study animal population and 
it is included in the Red Natura 2000 of Spain having a special normative for its 
conservation [15]. It is a special protected area located near from Puerto Sagunto, in 
Valencia Community. 
 
Figure 14 Marjals dels Moros location. Source: Google Earth 
 
For diesel spill on water surface, only marine birds are affected in the surrounds 
of Marjals dels Moros.  Other species like mammals, reptiles or ground birds are not 
selected because their presence is not relevant in the marine water in this area. The 
Table 29 shows the population of ground and sea bird in the Marjals of Moros.  
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Table 29 Ground Bird and seabird species identified in Marjal dels Moros [15] 
Specie 
Population 
Sedentary Reproductive Wintering 
Carricerín real 40- 75p     
Common Martín Pescador P     
Garza Imperial   4 - 12p   
Garcilla cangrejera   2p   
Chorlitejo patinegro   6 - 15p   
Fumarel cariblanco   40 - 200p   
Aguilucho lagunero occidental     0 - 9i 
Aguilucho cenizo       
Garceta grande     0 - 1i 
Common Garceta     3 - 50i 
Focha moruna   0 - 1p 0 - 5i 
Common canastera   38 - 100p   
Common cigüeñuela   16 - 48p 0 - 2i 
Common avetorrillo   19 - 52p   
Aguja colinta     0 - 21i 
Cerceta pardilla   0 - 2p   
Malvasía cabeciblanca   0 - 2p   
Common flamenco     0 - 30i 
Common Morito       
European chorlito dorado     0 - 158i 
Common Calalmón 29-58p   14-73i 
Common avoceta   2-4p   
Common charrancito   60-163p   
Common charrán   50-200p   
Charrán patinegro     R 
P: Pairs; i: Individual; R: scarce 
 
Continue to the species identification according to the Marjal dels Moros 
normative [15], seabird species identified are Cerceta pardilla, Malvasía cabeciblanca, 
Fumarel cariblanco, common Charrancito, common Charrán and Charrán patinegro. 
For the damage quantification, it is assumed that threatened species are affected in 
their entirety and non-threatened species are affected by 25%.  To cover the worst 
case scenario, it is assumed that 100% of affected birds die on contact with the spilled 
substance. EROM estimated six months to recover the damage caused. This time 
comprises the incubation period, birth and release from captivity of the species 
concerned to restore. Table 30 shows the seabird population affected by the diesel 
spilled on sea water.  
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Table 30 Potential Affected Bird species in Marjal dels Moros area 
Species  Reference population 
(Individual) 
Average  
(individual) 
Affected 
Population 
(individual) Minimum Maximum  
Cerceta pardilla (Mamaronetta 
angustirosris)  
0 4 2 2 
Malvasía cabeciblanca (Oxyura 
leucocephala)  
0 4 2 2 
Total Threatened species affected 4 
Fumarel cariblanco (Chlidonias hybrida) 80 400 240 60 
Common Charrancito (Sternula albifrons) 120 326 223 56 
Common Charrán (Sterna hirundo)  100 400 250 63 
Charrán patinegro - - - - 
Total Non-Threatened species affected 178 
 
As required by the regulations, the amount of financial guarantee is related to 
the estimated cost of primary and compensatory repairs. The calculation performed by 
EROM methodology proposes the financial budget showed in Table 31 to recover the 
estimated damage caused. Appendix VI shows the complete calculation report by 
EROM tool.  
Table 31  Scope estimation by EROM Tool  [10] 
Combination  Agent - Resource Repairs Amount 
Fuel oil and  NVOC  non biodegradable  - Marine 
Water 
Primary repair 329.131.98 € 
Compensatory repair 329.131.98 € 
Total damage repairs 658.263.96 € 
Fuel oil and  NVOC  non biodegradable  -
Marmaronetta  angustirostris (Dead) 
Primary repair 38.046.35 € 
Compensatory repair 25.558.97 € 
Total damage repairs 63.605.32 € 
Fuel oil and  NVOC  non biodegradable  -Non-
Threatened birds (Dead) 
Primary repair 27.891.51 € 
Compensatory repair 25.482.60 € 
Total damage repairs 53.374.11 € 
Total damage repairs   775.243.39 € 
Total financial guarantee         775.243.39 € 
As shown in Table 31, the financial guarantee is 775243.39 €. This amount 
represents the obligatory financial guarantee that the operator has to constitute 
according to the Royal Decree 183/2015.   
Additionally, financial guarantee shows the combination agent-resource most 
relevant to the study. Figure 15 demonstrates that marine water affectation cover 
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84.91% of the total guarantee estimation, representing the relevant damage to the 
environment. The operator has to prepare all emergency operational procedure to act 
in case of an accidental spill and cover the biggest affectation of the environment.   
 
Figure 15 Financial guarantee distribution of Resource affectation by diesel spill. 
 
Finally, prevention and mitigation actions have to be included. Article 33 of 
Royal Decree 183/2015 sets the value of 10% of primary repair to calculate final value 
of the financial guarantee. Table 32 shows the financial guarantee of the regasificacion 
natural gas plant.  
Table 32 Financial Guarantee of the reference scenario 
Repair Amount 
Prevention and mitigation 39.506.98 € 
Primary Reparation 395.069.84 € 
Financial Guarantee  434.576.82 € 
Compensatory reparation 380.173.55 € 
Financial Guarantee 814.750.37 € 
 
The financial guarantee of 814.750.37€ comprises the range established by the 
RD 183/2015 between 300k – 200M Euros, which established the exemption of the 
financial guarantee if the company has implemented an environmental management 
system such as UNE-EN ISO 14001 or EMAS. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The environmental risk assessment of a liquefied natural gas drives to the 
following conclusions:  
• Initiating events identified in the installation are related to pipe rupture, storage 
tank failure and cistern tank leakage.  
• Scenario 7.1.A. “diesel discharges into the sea because diesel + firewater 
overflowing the tank dike” is the reference scenario identified by the EDI 
methodology. This scenario comprised the 5.32% of the total risk scenarios and 
the highest environmental damage with an EDI value of 1303842. 
• Diesel, THT and hydraulic oil were the relevant dangerous substances identified 
that could affect the environment in a LNG plant. Other inorganic substances 
such as sodium bisulfite or sodium hypochlorite are not included in the 
evaluation because EDI methodology established infinite dilution if exist a spill of 
these substances into the sea.  
• Even natural gas is the most dangerous substance in the installation is not the 
most relevant substance affecting the environment. Natural gas is important for 
its affectation to other installations in case of deflagration, fire, jet fire and 
explosion by the domino effect, releasing dangerous substances from storage 
tanks or main pipelines. 
• Environmental evaluation identifies the affectation of 708 m
3 
of marine water, 4 
threatened and 178 non-threatened seabird species. 
• The financial guarantee estimation demonstrates that marine water affectation 
cover 84.91% of the total guarantee estimation, representing the most relevant 
damage to the environment by diesel spill. 
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APPENDIX I: ACRONYMS 
A. B. C= EDI modificators 
Ad = Surface area of the basin or spill. m2. 
AENOR=Spanish Association for Normalization and 
Certification. 
EAS: Environmental Accidental Scenario. 
Eca= Access to the damage area cost. 
Ecc= Reparation consulting cost. 
Ecf= Fix cost estimation 
Ecr=Project control and review cost. 
Ecu=Unit cost estimation 
EDI=Environmental Damage Index. 
ERA= Environmental Risk Assessment.  
EROM =Environmental Responsibility Offer Model. 
GMO= genetically modified organisms 
HCl: Hydrochloric Acid 
INSHT=Spain National Institute of Safety and Health at Work. 
LNG: Liquefied Natural GAS. 
Macc= Quantitive of resource affected.  
MAGRAMA=Environmental, food and agriculture Spain 
Ministry. 
Mp = Mass of chemical spilled, kg. 
NaHSO3: Sodium Bisulfite 
NaOCl: Sodium Hypochlorite  
NG: Natural Gas 
NVOC= Non volatile Organic chemical substance 
q. p= resource EDI modification parameter. 
SVOC= Semivolatile Organic chemical substance 
T (s) = Fire duration, seconds. 
THT: Tetrahydrothiophene. 
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency 
Vc = Burning rate, kg / m2.s 
β= Distant from nearest access road. 
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APPENDIX II: FAUL TREES 
 
II.1. Diesel spill during truck discharge 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Diesel Spill during truck
discharge
Occurs leakage
Human error
(Dont act)
Hose Failure
Instantaneus Tank
wagon spill
Discharge Happen
1.00E -3 actions-1 3.50E-2 year-1
1.14E-4 year-1
OR
1.00E-5 year-1
Operational conditions:
No download / year: 1
Duration shock: 1 h
No hoses: 1
Human error. Operator does not act 
closing valve to the cistern when hose 
rupture occur
AND
5.14E-9 
times/ year-1
AND
Occurs leakage
through tank valve
3.50E-5 year-1
4.50E-5 year-1
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II.2. THT spill during truck discharge 
 
 
II.3. THT leakage in main tank 
 
THT Spill during truck
discharge
Occurs leakage
Human error
(Dont act)
Hose Failure
Instantaneus Tank
wagon spill
Discharge Happen
1.00E -3 actions-1 3.50E-2 year-1
1.71E-4 year-1
OR
1.00E-5 year-1
Operational conditions:
No download / year: 1
Discharge duration: 1 ,5h
No hoses: 1
Human error. Operator does not act 
closing valve to the cistern when hose 
rupture occur
AND
1.74E-9 
times/ year-1
AND
Occurs leakage
through tank valve
3.50E-5 year-1
4.50E-5 year-1
THT leakage in main tank
Instanstaneous 
leakage
Total line rupture
(10m)
5.00E-6 year-1
1.15E-6 
times/ year-1
OR
Orifice Aerial Tank
1.00E-4 year-1/m 1.00E-6 year-1
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II.4. Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of loading/unloading arm 
 
 
II.5. Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of loading/unloading arm 
 
 
 
AND
Hydraulic oil leakage
for rupture of a
loading/unloading
arm
Arm rupture
Discharge Happens
1.27E-4 
times/ year-1
2.63E-4 yeat-1
Operational conditions:
Annual operating hours: 4,244 h
No downloads / year: 104
Download duration: 12 hours
No. liquid arms: 3
No load / year: 10
Duration charging: 50 h
No. liquid arms: 1
or
Loading Happens
Arm on operation 4.84E-1 year-1
4.27E-1 year-1 5.70E-2 year-1
Diesel leakage in main 
tank
Instanstaneous 
leakage
Total line rupture
(10m)
5.00E-6 year-1
1.15E-6 
times/ year-1
OR
Orifice Aerial Tank
1.00E-4 year-1/m 1.00E-6 year-1
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II.6. Sodium bisulfite spill during truck discharge 
 
 
 
 
 
Sodium bisulfite Spill
during truck discharge
Occurs leakage
Human error
(Dont act)
Hose Failure
Instantaneus Tank
wagon spill
Discharge Happen
1.00E -3 actions-1 3.50E-2 year-1
8.56E-4 year-1
OR
1.00E-5 year-1
Operational conditions:
No download / year: 5
Duration shock: 1 h
No hoses: 1
Human error. Operator does not act 
closing valve to the cistern when hose 
rupture occur
AND
1.59E-9 
times/ year-1
AND
Occurs leakage
through tank valve
3.50E-5 year-1
4.50E-5 year-1
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APPENDIX III INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY CALCULATION 
Table III.1 Initiating event frequency calculation 
Initiating event Basic failure 
element 
Operational 
Conditions 
Basic 
Frequency  
(year-1) 
Initiating 
event 
frequency 
(times/year) 
LNG leakage during 
loading/unloading of a 
methane vessel 
Total pipeline 
rupture     D > 6”   
(Freq. Length line) 
Operation hours = 
104*12*4 
104 unloading/years 
Arm 
12 hours/discharge 
4 arm 
h = 10*50*2 
10 loading/years Arm 
50  hours/discharge 
2 Arm 
1.00E-07 5.99E-04 
Hydraulic oil leakage for 
rupture of a 
loading/unloading arm 
Arm rupture           
(Prob h-1) 
Operation hours = 
104*12*4 
104 unloading/years     
4 Arm 
12 hours/discharge 
4 arm 
h = 10*50*2 
10 loading/years Arm 
50  hours/discharge 
2 Arm 
3.00E-08 1.80E-04 
LNG leakage from 36” 
loading pipeline to 
storage tanks 
Total pipeline 
rupture     D > 6”   
(Freq. Length line) 
Length= 42 m 
Operation Year = 
1248/(365*24) 
1.00E-07 5.98E-07 
LNG leakage from 20” 
secondary pumps 
manifold 
Total pipeline 
rupture     D > 6”   
(Freq. Length line) 
Length = 37 m 
Year = 8760/(365*24) 
1.00E-07 3.70E-06 
LNG leakage during 
loading operation of a 
cistern truck 
Hose rupture 
(Prob h-1) 
hours = 12.410 4.00E-06 4.96E-02 
NG leakage in 
measurement station 
pipeline 
Total pipeline 
rupture     D > 6”   
(Freq. Length 
line)” 
Length= 60 m 
diameter= 16" 
Hours./year: 7800 h 
2.62E-06 1.40E-04 
THT leakage in 
Odorization system 
storage tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in single 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
Length= 10m 
5.00E-06 1.15E-04 
Continuous 
release orifice 
1.00E-04 
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Table III.1 Initiating event frequency calculation 
Initiating event Basic failure 
element 
Operational 
Conditions 
Basic 
Frequency  
(year-1) 
Initiating 
event 
frequency 
(times/year) 
Total line rupture   
D < 3” 
1,00E-06 
THT leakage during 
operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
Instantaneous 
release of an 
atmospheric 
cistern truck 
  
  
- 
1,00E-05 1,74E-09 
Hose rupture 
(Prob. h-1) 
3,50E-02 
Human error / 
Operator in action 
(Not act) 
1,00E-03 
Discharge happens 1 discharge/year 
1,5 hours/discharge 
1,71E-04 
THT leakage in 
distribution pipeline 
Total line rupture   
D < 3” 
Length = 50 m 1,00E-06 5,00E-05 
Sodium bisulfite leakage 
in storage tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in single 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
 
5,00E-06 1,15E-04 
Aerial tank orifice 
leakage 
1,00E-04 
Total line rupture   
D < 3” 
Length= 10m 1,00E-06 
Sodium bisulfite leakage  
during operation of 
cistern tank unloading 
Atmospheric 
cistern tank 
leakage 
  
  
- 
1,00E-05 1,59E-07 
Hose rupture 
(Prob. h-1) 
3,50E-02 
Human error (Act) 1,00E-03 
Discharge happens 5 discharge/year 
1 hours/discharge 
8,56E-04 
Sodium hypochlorite 
leakage in storage tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in single 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
5,00E-06 5,00E-06 
HCL leakage in storage 
tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in single 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
5,00E-06 5,00E-06 
Diesel leakage in storage  
fire pump  
Instantaneous 
leakage in double 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
1,25E-08 1,25E-08 
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Table III.1 Initiating event frequency calculation 
Initiating event Basic failure 
element 
Operational 
Conditions 
Basic 
Frequency  
(year-1) 
Initiating 
event 
frequency 
(times/year) 
Diesel leakage in main 
tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in single 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 
5,00E-06 1,15E-04 
Aerial tank orifice 
leakage 
- 
1,00E-04 
Total line rupture   
D < 3” 
Length = 10 m 1,00E-06 
Diesel leakage in 
distribution pipeline 
Total line rupture   
D < 3” 
Length = 230 m 
1,00E-06 2,30E-04 
Diesel leakage during 
operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
Instantaneous 
release of an 
atmospheric 
cistern truck 
  
  
  
1,00E-05 5,14E-09 
Hose rupture 
(Prob. h-1) 
4,00E-06 
Human error (Act) 1,00E-03 
Discharge happens 1 discharge/year 
1 hours/discharge 
1,14E-04 
Diesel leakage in 
emergency generator 
tank 
Instantaneous 
leakage in double 
wall atmospheric 
tank 
- 1,25E-08 1,25E-08 
Fire in electrical 
substation 
Short circuit     
(Freq. h
-1
) 
h = 365*24  
All year operation 
1,00E-06 8,76E-03 
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COD Initiating Event A B C D Environmental Accidental Scenario   
A Instantaneous Ignition                   
B Delayed Ignition         
Jet Fire affecting following tanks: 
1.- Diesel main tank: Diesel discharge into the sea *  
2- THT main tank: THT discharge into the sea ** 
  
C Hazardous Chemical substance tank affectation     P4 0,95   
D Fire system activation              
              P3 0,3       
      P1 0,04                  Spill Volume   
                      Frequency (Years-1) 1,60E-06 Diesel  18,00   
                          THT  6,65   
                      Pool fire into THT or Diesel tank dike. Thermal 
radiation will not affect others installation for the 
domino effect. Forest areas will not be affected also. 
  
                  1-P4 0,05   
4.1 NG leakage in 
measurement 
station pipeline 
                  
                  
Frequency (years
-1
) 
8,40E-08   
  
Frequency 
(years
 -1
) 
1,40E-04 
        
1-
P3 0,7     
Jet fire without affect any storage tank of hazardous 
chemical substances. 
  
                        
                      Frequency (Years-1) 3,92E-06   
          P2 0,96         Flash fire without affect any storage tank of 
hazardous chemical substances. 
  
                        
      1-P1 0,96             Frequency (Years-1) 1,29E-04   
          
1-
P2 0,04         
Dispersion and dilution of the flammable cloud 
without consequences to the environment.  
  
                        
                      Frequency (Years-1) 5,37E-06   
* Because diesel+firewater overflow the tank dike, and drag of diesel through the rainy water channel to sea.     
** Because THT+firewater overflow the tank dike, and drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea.       
                                
Figure IV.1   NG leakage in measurement station pipeline Event Tree 
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COD Initiating Event Instantaneous 
Ignition 
Fire 
protection 
system 
activation 
Rainy valves 
closed 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
                           
                  
THT discharge into the sea because THT+firewater overflow the retention 
system, and drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea.  
 
              P3 0,999  
                   
          P2 0,95     Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1,07E-10 12,89  
                  THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea.  
 
      P1 0,065     1-P3 0,001  
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1,08E-13 15,00  
          1-P2 0,05     
Pool fire into THT retention system and surroundings. Thermal radiation will 
not affect others installation for the domino effect. Forest areas will not be 
affected also. 
 
5.3 THT leakage during 
operation of cistern tank 
unloading 
             
              
 
  
Frequency 
(years -1)  
1,74E-09  
            Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
 
 
                  5,66E-12 0,00  
                  THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea.  
 
              P4 0,999  
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
      1-P1 0,935         1,63E-09 12,89  
                  THT discharge into the sea because the retention system is overflow. A THT 
cloud will not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
 
              1-P4 0,001  
                   
                  Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
                  1,63E-12 15,00  
Figure IV.2   THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading Event Tree 
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COD Initiating Event 
Instantaneous 
Ignition 
Fire protection 
system 
activation 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
                       
              Diesel discharge into the sea because 
Diesel+firewater overflow the tank dike, and 
drag of Diesel through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
 
          P2 0,95  
              
 
      P1 0,01     Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              1,09E-06 18,00  
            
                       
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire into Diesel tank dike. Thermal 
radiation will not affect others installation for 
the domino effect. Forest areas will not be 
affected also. 
 
7.1 Diesel leakage in main tank          
  
Frequency (years 
-1
) 1,15E-04 
        
 
              Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              5,75E-08 0,00  
            
                       
              The retention basin is watertight. A THT cloud 
will not generate a concentration between LEL 
- UEL range that could generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments.  
 
      1-P1 0,99      
               
               
              Frequency (years
-1
) Spill Vol. M
3
  
              1,14E-04 0.00  
          
Figure IV.3 Diesel leakage in main tank Event tree 
  
     7
0
COD Initiating Event Event happens? Environmental Accidental Scenario 
                         
            P1 1 Hydraulic oil spill to the sea  
                Frequency (years
-1
)         1,80E-04 Spill Vol. M
3      
0,45  
1.2 Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of a loading/unloading arm     
 
 
 
      Frequency (years -1) 1,80E-04      
            1-P1 0 No significant impact to the environment. It has been considered in 
case of break or leak in the hydraulic circuit with arm out of service, 
hydraulic oil will spread inside the plant facilities 
 
                 
                 
                         
Figure IV.4 Hydraulic oil leakage for rupture of a loading/unloading arm event tree 
COD Initiating Event 
Instantaneous 
Ignition 
Fire protection 
system 
activation 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill 
Volume 
(M3) 
                          
          P2 0,95 THT discharge into the sea because THT + firewater 
overflow the tank dike, and drag of THT through 
the rainy water channel to sea.   
7,10E-06 6,65 
                  
      P1 0,065         
                          
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire into THT tank dike. Thermal radiation will 
not affect others installation for the domino effect. 
Forest areas will not be affected also. 
3,74E-07   
5.1 THT leakage in Odorization system 
storage tank 
            
              
 Frequency (years 
-1
) 1,15E-04        
            The retention basin is watertight. A THT cloud will 
not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash fire and affect 
other equipments.  
1,08E-04   
      1-P1 0,935         
                  
                  
                          
Figure IV.5 THT leakage in Odorization system storage tank event tree 
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Initiating Event 
Instantaneous 
Ignition 
FPS 
activation 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill 
Volume 
(M
3
) 
                          
          P2 0,95 THT discharge into the sea because firewater 
will drag THT through the rainy water 
channel to sea.  
3,09E-06 0,01 
                  
      P1 0,065         
                          
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire in surroundings. Thermal radiation 
will not affect others installation for the 
domino effect. Forest areas will not be 
affected also. 
1,63E-07   
5.2 THT leakage in distribution pipeline             
  Frequency (years 
-1
) 5,00E-05             
                  
                          
              THT discharge into the sea through the rainy 
water channel. A THT cloud will not generate 
a concentration between LEL - UEL range 
that could generate a flash fire and affect 
other equipments. 
4,68E-05 0,01 
      1-P1 0,935         
                  
                  
                  
 
      
Figure IV.6 THT leakage in distribution pipeline event tree 
COD Initiating Event 
Rainy valves closed   
Human Error (Don’t Act) 
Environmental Accidental Scenario 
Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill 
Volume 
(M
3
) 
                      
      P1 0,999 Sodium bisulfite spill without consequences 
to the environment.  
1,58E-07   
              
6.2 Sodium bisulfite leakage  during operation of 
cistern tank unloading     
 
    
  Frequency (years 
-1
) 1,59E-07         
      1-P1 0,001 Sodium bisulfite discharge into the see 1,59E-10 15,00 
 Figure IV.7 Sodium bisulfite leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading event tree 
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COD Initiating Event Instantaneous 
Ignition 
FPS activation Environmental Accidental Scenario Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill Volume 
(M
3
) 
 FPS: Fire Protection System Activation                     
              Diesel discharges into the sea because firewater 
will drag Diesel through the rainy water channel 
to sea.  
2,19E-06 0,47 
          P2 0,95     
      P1 0,01                 
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire in surroundings. Thermal radiation will 
not affect others installation for the domino 
effect. Forest areas will not be affected also. 
1,15E-07   
7.2 Diesel leakage in distribution 
pipeline             
  Frequency (years 
-1
) 2,30E-04                     
              Diesel discharge into the sea through the rainy 
water channel. A cloud will not generate a 
concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
2,28E-04 0,47 
      1-P1 0,99         
                  
              
  
        
Figure IV.8 Diesel leakage in distribution pipeline event tree 
COD Initiating Event Instantaneous 
Ignition 
FPS activation Environmental Accidental Scenario Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill Vol 
(M3) 
  FPS: Fire Protection System Activation                   
              Diesel discharges into the sea because firewater will drag 
Diesel through the rainy water channel to sea.  
4,88E-11 15,00 
          P2 0,95     
      P1 0,01                 
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire in spill area. Thermal radiation will not affect 
others installation for the domino effect. Forest areas 
will not be affected also. 
2,57E-12   
7.3 Diesel leakage during operation of 
cistern tank unloading             
 Frequency (years 
-1
) 5,14E-09        
    1-P1 0,99     Diesel discharge into the see through rainy channels.  A 
diesel flammable cloud will not generate a concentration 
between LEL - UEL range that could generate a flash fire 
and affect other equipments. 
5,09E-09 15,00 
                
                          
Figure IV.9 Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading Event tree 
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COD Initiating Event Instantaneous 
Ignition 
FPS 
activation 
Environmental Accidental Scenario Frequency 
(years-1) 
Spill Vol 
(M3) 
 FPS: Fire Protection System Activation                       
              Diesel discharges into the sea because 
firewater will drag Diesel through the rainy 
water channel to sea.  
1,19E-10 2,70 
          P2 0,95     
                  
      P1 0,01                 
                          
          1-P2 0,05 Pool fire in spill area. Thermal radiation will 
not affect others installation for the domino 
effect. Forest areas will not be affected also. 
6,25E-12   
8.1 Diesel leakage in emergency generator tank             
                  
                          
              Diesel discharge into the see through rainy 
channels. A diesel flammable cloud will not 
generate a concentration between LEL - UEL 
range that could generate a flash fire and 
affect other equipments. 
1,24E-08 2,70 
      1-P1 0,99         
                  
                  
                  
                          
Figure IV.10 Diesel leakage in emergency generator tank event tree
  
74 
APPENDIX V: EDI CALCULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V.1 EDI Calculation for scenario 1.2.A Hydraulic oil spill to the sea 
Scenario  1.2.A Hydraulic oil spill to the sea 
EDI Substance Hydraulic Oil 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marine bed 
Parameters   
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators Ma     
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators MB MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
1880.71 30651.77 15984.57 
EDI  
Scenario 
48517 
                                                                                          Environmental Risk Assessment of a LNG Plant 
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Table V. 2EDI Calculation for scenario NG leakage in measurement station pipeline 4.1.A and Diesel 
leakage in main tank 7.1.A 
Scenario  4.1.A  Jet Fire affecting following tanks: Diesel main tank: Diesel discharge into the 
sea 
7.1.A Diesel discharge into the sea because Diesel+ firewater overflow the tank 
dike and drag of Diesel through the rainy water channel to sea. 
EDI Substance Diesel 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 
1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 15.53 36.00 36.00 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
58353.62 886190.37 358171.17 
EDI  
Scenario 
1302715 
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Table V. 3 EDI Calculation for scenarios  NG leakage in measurement station pipeline 4.1.B / THT leakage 
in Odorization system storage tank 5.1.A 
Scenario  4.1.B Jet Fire affecting following tanks: THT main tank: THT discharge into the sea  
5.1.A THT discharge into the sea because THT + firewater overflow the tank dike 
and  drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea. 
EDI Substance THT 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 866 11866 2373 
α 7.03 14.06 14.06 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marine bed 
Parameters   
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
6271.32 349818.99 143640.70 
EDI  
Scenario 
499731 
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Table V. 4EDI Calculation for scenarios THT leakage in distribution pipeline 5.2.A / 5.2.B 
Scenario  5.2.A THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea. 
5.2.B THT discharge into the sea through the rainy water channel. A THT cloud will 
not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
EDI Substance THT 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 866 11866 2373 
α 0.14 0.27 0.27 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marine bed 
Parameters   
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
124.58 12926.40 8895.02 
EDI  
Scenario 
21946 
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Table V. 5 EDI Calculation for scenarios THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 5.3.A / 
5.3.C 
Scenario 5.3.A THT discharge into the sea because THT + firewater overflow the 
retention system and drag of THT through the rainy water channel to sea. 
5.3.C THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through 
the rainy water channel to sea. 
EDI Substance THT 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 866 11866 2373 
α 13.02 26.04 26.04 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
11616.31 642768.90 260810.79 
EDI  
Scenario 
915196 
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Table V. 6 EDI Calculation for scenarios THT leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 5.3.B / 
5.3.D 
Scenario  5.3.B THT discharge into the sea because firewater will drag THT through the rainy 
water channel to sea. 
5.3.D THT discharge into the sea because the retention system is overflow. A THT 
cloud will not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
EDI Substance THT 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 866 11866 2373 
α 15.02 30.04 30.04 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
13397.97 740418.64 299867.39 
EDI  
Scenario 
1053684 
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Table V. 7 EDI Calculation for scenarios Diesel leakage in firewater pumps tank 6.5.A / 6.5.B 
Scenario  6.5.A Diesel discharges into the sea because firewater will drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
6.5.B Diesel discharge into the see through rainy channels. A diesel flammable 
cloud will not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
EDI Substance Diesel 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 7.85 18.04 18.04 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 29482.63 447094.67 182547.69 
EDI  
Scenario 
659125 
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Table V. 8 EDI Calculation for scenarios Diesel leakage in distribution pipeline  7.2.A / 7.2.B 
Scenario  7.2.A Diesel discharges into the sea because firewater will drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
7.2.B Diesel discharge into the sea through the rainy water channel. A cloud will 
not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could generate a flash 
fire and affect other equipments. 
EDI Substance Diesel 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 0.30 0.69 0.69 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
1131.85 23105.02 12966.13 
EDI  
Scenario 
37203 
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Table V. 9 EDI Calculation for scenarios Diesel leakage during operation of cistern tank unloading 7.3.A / 
7.3.B 
Scenario  7.3.A Diesel discharges into the sea because firewater will drag Diesel through the 
rainy water channel to sea. 
7.3.B Diesel discharge into the see through rainy channels.  A diesel flammable 
cloud will not generate a concentration between LEL - UEL range that could 
generate a flash fire and affect other equipments. 
EDI Substance Diesel 
EDI Resource Marine Water Threat bird species Not Threat bird species 
EDI Group 1 16 16 
EDI Parameters Ecf 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecu 3648 11866 2373 
α 13.07 30.04 30.04 
Ec 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Ecr 1.934 6027 6027 
Ecc 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marine bed 
Parameters  
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Macc 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MA2 0.00 1.00 1.00 
A 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Modificators 
MB 
MB1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB2 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MB15 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MB18 1.00 0.00 0.00 
B 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Modificators 
Ma 
MC1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
MC5 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EDI  
Combination 
49103.88 740532.99 299913.13 
EDI  
Scenario 
1089550 
 
  
 
 
